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Can communal heterogeneity explain persistent 
educational inequities in developing countries? The 
paper uses a novel data-set from rural Pakistan that 
explicitly recognizes the geographic structure of villages 
and the social makeup of constituent hamlets to show 
that demand for schooling is sensitive to the allocation 
of schools across ethnically fragmented communities. 
The analysis focuses on two types of social barriers: 
stigma based on caste affiliation and female seclusion 
that is more rigidly enforced outside a girl’s own hamlet. 
Results indicate a substantial decrease in primary school 
enrollment rates for girls who have to cross hamlet 
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boundaries to attend, irrespective of school distance, an 
effect not present for boys. However, low-caste children, 
both boys and girls, are deterred from enrolling when 
the most convenient school is in a hamlet dominated by 
high-caste households. In particular, low-caste girls, the 
most educationally disadvantaged group, benefit from 
improved school access only when the school is also caste-
concordant. A policy experiment indicates that providing 
schools in low-caste dominant hamlets would increase 
overall enrollment by almost twice as much as a policy of 
placing a school in every unserved hamlet, and would do 
so at one-sixth of the cost.
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1 Introduction
Large and persistent schooling differentials—between boys and girls and across chil-
dren from different social groups—in much of the developing world pose a challenge
to the canonical human capital investment model with its focus on market returns
to education.1 How much of the male-bias in educational attainment still observed
in South Asia (Filmer et al., 1998) or of the disadvantage of children from low-caste
families (Drèze and Kingdon, 2001) can be explained by differences in economic re-
turns? Or rather, to turn the question around, how important are differences across
groups in the costs of attending school? In this paper, we investigate a hitherto
neglected dimension of educational choice: social barriers to schooling arising from
communal heterogeneity.
An emerging empirical literature highlights the negative impact of social frag-
mentation on the provision of local public goods (see Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005;
Banerjee et al. 2005; Khwaja, 2009). Miguel and Gugerty (2005), for example,
show how ethnic diversity can lead to collective action failure, manifesting itself
as an underfunding of school facilities in rural Kenya. While social heterogeneity
can thus constrain educational attainment through the supply channel, we turn the
spotlight for the first time on the demand channel. Since it is usually not eco-
nomical to provide a school to each settlement, let alone multiple facilities catering
to each social group within a settlement, access to schooling will inevitably require
many to cross boundaries, be they geographical or hierarchical ones. The question
we ask is whether this constitutes a significant constraint on school enrollment.
Our context is rural Pakistan, where boys are not only much more likely than
girls to attend primary school, but the enrollment gap between children from "high-
caste" households over those from "low-caste" households is nearly as large. Two
features of Pakistani society are central to our analysis. The first, the custom
of purdah or female seclusion, restricts women’s and girl’s access to public spaces,
but is more rigidly enforced outside of the immediate community—specifically, the
hamlet or settlement—than within it. Thus, we will argue, sending a daughter to
a school located outside of her settlement (even though still within her village) is
more costly than sending her to one equally far away but within her settlement.
The second feature involves caste differentiation in which the low status group is
marked as "unclean" and hence subject to discrimination and ostracism by the high
1For applications emphasizing human capital return differentials see, e.g., Rosenzweig and
Schultz (1982), Foster and Rosenzweig (1996), Behrman et al. (1999), and Jensen (2010).
1
status group. To the extent that the latter group dominates the community (cf.,
Anderson, 2011), it may be able (and willing) to exclude the former group from
accessing local public services. Thus, for low-caste households, sending a child,
male or female, to a school dominated by higher castes is more costly than sending
him or her to a caste-concordant school.
We examine these issues using a novel data-set that explicitly recognizes the
geographic structure of villages and the social structure of their constituent settle-
ments. Our evidence shows that, controlling for distance to school, the odds of
ever enrolling are substantially lower for girls who would need to cross settlement
boundaries to attend, an effect not present for boys and one that does not appear
to be an artifact of school allocation decisions. Once we distinguish children by
their caste, however, the crossing-boundary effect remains relevant only for high-
status girls; among low-castes, neither boys nor girls benefit from having a school
located within their own settlement. This phenomenon can be attributed to the
fact that many low-caste children reside in high-caste dominant settlements, where
their families originally settled to provide services to the landowning class. In these
settlements, low caste children are stigmatized and face high psychic costs of at-
tending school. But, when the most convenient school happens to be in a low-caste
dominant settlement, we find low-caste children are much more likely to enroll.
Experiments conducted in India by Hoff and Pandey (2006) suggest that caste-
based stigma plays a powerful and early role in human capital formation. Low-caste
children perform poorly on cognitive tests when in the presence of their high-caste
counterparts, but only if their caste status is made public; if caste is kept private,
both groups do equally well. Munshi and Rosenzweig (2006), meanwhile, argue
that low-caste households, who tend to have looser ties to ancestral kin networks,
perceive a greater return to education (see also Luke and Munshi, 2007). Our
findings imply that once the playing field is level—i.e., absent communal barriers
and the associated stigma—low-caste children are actually no less likely to enroll in
school than high-caste children. Indeed, low-caste girls, the most educationally
disadvantaged group, would achieve substantially higher enrollment rates if given
access to caste-concordant schools, whether these schools are placed inside or outside
their own settlement. We will show that a policy of building village schools designed
to serve low-caste children would increase overall enrollment by almost twice as much
as a policy of placing a school in every currently unserved settlement, and would do
so at one-sixth of the cost.
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The next section of the paper describes the data used in our empirical analysis.
Section 3 lays out the context, describing the structure of villages, the nature of fe-
male seclusion norms, and the salience of caste, following which, in sections 4, 5, and
6 we present, respectively, our empirical framework, results, and policy experiment.
We conclude in section 7.
2 Data
Our analysis combines representative household survey data with information from
a village and school census undertaken in the two most populous provinces of Pak-
istan, Punjab and Sindh. The household data come from the second round of the
Pakistan Rural Household Survey (PRHS-II) conducted in 2004-05, in which 3519
households were randomly drawn from 165 villages. The school census collects de-
tailed information on all schools inside each of these villages as well as schools lying
within a 2 km walk of the perimeter of each settlement/habitation of the village.2
GPS coordinates are available for households and schools, so the distance between
each can be calculated. The hamlet in which households and schools are located
is also known. The PRHS-II village census provides land ownership data and the
caste/clan (zaat/biradari) affiliation of every household in each of the 165 villages.
The school census identifies 1326 schools of which 1112 (84%) have classes at the
elementary level (up to grade 5). Of these, 63% are exclusively elementary schools,
while the rest had an elementary school attached to a middle or high school. Since
three-fourths of elementary schools are public (90% in Sindh province), government
school allocation is central in determining access to education (Appendix Table A.1,
Panel A). Among elementary schools, 51% are coeducational, 28% are exclusively
for boys and 21% exclusively for girls. Public elementary schools are far more likely
to be single-sex (62%) compared to private ones (13%).
We consider all children who were age 9-15 in the survey year; practically all
of the children who ever enroll in school have already done so by the age of nine.
Married girls, which constitute just one percent of females in this age range, are
2Given the difficulty in identifying all schools to which children in a village may have access,
the school census was conducted in two stages. In the first stage, all schools inside the village, as
well as all schools within a 2 km radius of each settlement, were visually identified and a school
list was drawn up. This list was provided to all survey teams conducting the household survey.
During the household survey, any non-listed schools identified by sample households were added
to the initial list. Likewise, any additional schools identified during the community focus group
exercise were incorporated into the final school census list.
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excluded since their initial enrollment decisions would have depended on conditions
in their natal homes rather than in their current residence. These criteria yield a
sample of 4,699 children, of which 2,192 (47%) are girls and 2,507 (53%) are boys.
Table 1 provides some descriptive statistics for the sample, highlighting, in par-
ticular, the importance of the school entry margin in rural Pakistan. Also evident
is the substantial gender gap in schooling, one that varies tremendously by region.
In the more developed North Punjab, 92% of boys and 85% girls had enrolled in
school by age nine, whereas the poorer southern part of Punjab and the entire
province of Sindh have much lower enrollment rates (just above 50% for girls) and
huge gender gaps favoring boys (17 and 24 percentage points, respectively). By
contrast, dropout rates from primary school are much less differentiated by gender
and region, perhaps because many girls who would have dropped out never entered
school to begin with. Conditional on having enrolled in school and not completed
the primary grades, 88% of 9-15 year-old boys are still in school compared to 81%
of girls, with gender gaps of 5, 5, and 9 percentage points in North Punjab, South
Punjab, and Sindh, respectively.3
3 Context
The term "village" in much of Pakistan, and indeed in large parts of South Asia,
has a dual connotation. On the one hand, the administrative or revenue village
is the lowest tier of the government’s administrative structure, at which public
services, such as schools and health workers, are allocated. Most administrative
or revenue villages, however, consist of several distinct clusters of habitations or
hamlets; though most residents would also refer to these as "villages", we will call
them "settlements." Among the 165 PHRS-II villages, for example, our village
census records 1031 named settlements. However, villages of North Punjab typically
are less geographically dispersed and have much fewer settlements than those of
Southern Punjab and Sindh (see Table 2 below).
3Beyond primary school, strong gender-region differences in dropout rates re-emerge. Condi-
tional on having completed primary school, 81% of 9-15 year-old boys are still enrolled in school
compared to 78% of girls, with region-specific gender gaps of 1, 15, and 22 percentage points,
respectively. Since post-primary school enrollment, conditional on reaching that decision point,
is driven more by the location of middle schools than of primary schools, we will have little more
to say about it in this paper.
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3.1 Seclusion practices and mobility constraints
Seclusion of women (purdah) is practiced widely and in varying degrees throughout
rural Pakistan. As they enter puberty, girls usually experience increased enforce-
ment of purdah norms and attendant restrictions on mobility and social interaction.
Limits on mobility for young unmarried girls include prohibitions on traveling un-
accompanied or the need to obtain permission to do so from a male family member.
These mobility constraints stem from a desire to maintain family honor (izzat),
which, in a conservative society, is intimately bound up with female reputation and
hence behavior, whether real or perceived. Unchaperoned travel outside the imme-
diate confines of the village and, especially, the settlement can invite damage to a
girl’s reputation.
Among households living in close proximity with long standing familial, caste, or
patronage ties, as would typically be the case within a settlement, there would tend
to be less harassment of each others womenfolk than of those from other settlements.
Support for this claim is found in the PRHS-II, where all married women age 15-40
were asked about their perception of safety within and outside their own settlement
as well as their use of any type of veil or purdah in public.4 While 80% of women
report feeling “safe” alone inside their own settlement, only 27% report feeling safe
alone outside of it. Similarly, only 14% of women report practicing full purdah
(coverage of whole body including face) out in public within their own settlement
compared to 31% outside their settlement. Thus, settlement boundaries appear to
matter as far as female reputational risk is concerned.
Other data also point to mobility restrictions as a key constraint on schooling for
girls. The nationally representative Pakistan Integrated Household Survey (PIHS)
of 2001-02 shows that enrollment decisions for girls in rural areas are more responsive
than those of boys to proximity to school (see World Bank, 2005), but this analysis
does not account for settlement boundary-crossing. More suggestive evidence comes
from the 2001-02 PRHS-I, in which parents of children never enrolled were asked
the main reason for the child’s non-enrollment. For boys, far and away the most
important reason is economic ("school too expensive" cited by 43% of parents), but
the picture is quite different for girls. While economic motives still dominate (32%
reported "school too expensive"), social constraints become an important consider-
ation. Respondents were much more likely to report that they did not "approve" of
4Veiling or purdah in this context is the use of a large shawl (chador) to cover the head and
the body, and sometimes also part of the face.
5
their non-enrolled daughters going to school (30%) than to disapprove of schooling
for non-enrolled sons (7.5%).
Field interviews conducted in five villages randomly selected, by region, from
the PRHS-II sample also highlight the importance of mobility constraints for girls
school enrollment, as the following quotes illustrate:5
"...I took my daughters out of school because it was too far to walk
and I feel that things are not safe there...” (woman, Southern Punjab)
“When sons go to schools that are far away we don’t get worried,
but for our daughter we get worried.” (woman, Southern Punjab).
“The problem is, when children are so small to attend primary school,
we cannot expect them to walk all the way to a school in another settle-
ment or another village. But when they grow a bit more mature, 8-9 yrs,
we cannot send girls alone to walk this distance. There are tall sugar-
cane fields and all the way is deserted except young boys, who use the
same route for going to school. This is very dangerous! The boys tease
young girls — anyone could push a little child, girl or boy in the fields,
one would not even know!" (woman, Southern Punjab)
3.2 Caste and Stigma
Caste has received scant attention in Pakistan, from any disciplinary perspective.
Indeed, the PRHS-II is the first large-scale survey, as far as we are aware, to collect
systematic data on caste affiliation in rural Pakistan. While caste groupings in
Pakistan cannot be precisely mapped into the much more extensively studied social
hierarchy of neighboring India, there are significant similarities between the two due
to their long shared history. In particular, caste identity is embedded within oc-
cupational differences, which are associated with status and notions of purity and
pollution. Various exclusionary norms follow from these hierarchies and are exer-
cised in relations of mutual assistance, in social networks, and in the establishment
and maintenance of political power within the village economy and without. Un-
like the Indian context, there has been no official acknowledgement of caste-based
5Khan (1998) provides similar evidence from North Punjab.
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discrimination in Pakistan and thus no affirmative action programs to mitigate its
impacts. Caste mobility through land transactions is also extremely limited.
We construct a caste-status identifier that categorizes dozens of distinctly named
caste/clan (zaat/biradari) groups into "high" and "low" caste. High-caste includes
all such groups that self-identify on the basis of traditional access to land (zamin-
dars). The low-caste group comprises zaats that were historically considered either
out-castes (similar to the dalits in India) or were in clientalist relationships with
zamindars as providers of services in the village economy; i.e. barbers, metalwork-
ers, clothes washers, etc. Based on this definition, around 25% of the population
from which we draw our sample consists of low-caste households, with the highest
proportion (35%) found in Sindh province.6
Village census data, summarized in Table 2, provide insight into residential pat-
terns by caste in rural Pakistan. Villages typically contain many more distinctly
named zaat/biradari groups than do their constituent settlements. Moreover, while
more than half of all settlements are comprised of just one caste-type (mostly high),
this is true of just 3% of villages. In short, settlements are far more segregated
along caste/clan lines than villages.
We define a caste-type as dominant if it owns the majority of land in the settle-
ment, based on land shares calculated from village census data. Anderson (2011),
citing Dumont’s (1970) emphasis on economic power rather than numerical prepon-
derance, uses precisely this definition of caste dominance for her study of Indian
villages. Of the 496 settlements from which our sample children are drawn, only 76
(15%) are low-caste dominant, reflecting both the smaller low-caste population and
their lower landownership.7 All but five of these settlements are located in South-
ern Punjab or Sindh. Among the low-caste children in our sample, 48% reside in
high-caste dominant settlements. By contrast, only 6% of high-caste children live
in low-caste dominant settlements.
Qualitative evidence gathered from field interviews documents how caste-based
stigma plays out in schools either to exclude low-caste children altogether or to make
them unwelcome. The following snippets are typical:
“No, there is no school for girls here. Our zamindar got a teacher
6Comparable numbers for India put the scheduled castes (dalits) at 15-20% and other backward
castes at 20-27% of the population.
7Table 2 reports that 17% of all settlements in the village census are low-caste dominant as
compared to only 4% of villages. This is further indication of the relative segregation of settlements
based on caste in rural Pakistan.
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appointed, mainly for children of his own zaat [high caste]. There is no
building for school. Children, both boys and girls sit in the verandah
of [the zamindar’s] autaq [meeting hall] to study.” (Low-caste woman,
Sindh)
“As the school for girls is closed since about two years, the [high-
caste] girls are taught primary classes in the boys school. Our daughters
cannot attend classes together with the [high-caste] girls. So our girls
are not attending any school currently...” (Low-caste woman, Sindh)
“The children of rich [high castes] are taught seriously but our chil-
dren are paid no attention to. Teachers treat children from poor house-
holds really badly. While our daughters have no access to the school at
all, our boys receive no attention from the teachers. All boys sit together
for classes but our boys sit on the floor.” (Low-caste woman, Sindh)
"They let the daughters of [high castes] use the latrines, but tell our
daughters to use the fields because you stink." (Low-caste woman, South-
ern Punjab)
"The teachers make the daughters of [high castes] sit inside the rooms,
under the fans. Our poor children sit outside, under the sun and dust."
(Low-caste woman, Southern Punjab)
3.3 Enrollment decisions
To avoid excessive notation, we verbally sketch a model of school entry. The decision
is, first and foremost, a forward looking one, since completing each level or grade has
an option value consisting of the net return to going on to the next level. However,
there is also a cost to attending school, which includes: (1) direct school fees and
other monetary outlays, (2) foregone labor in the home, (3) disutility of walking to
school, and (4) psychic cost of social pressure, stigma, reputational harm, etc.
We have argued that purdah restrictions on girls come into force at the onset of
puberty, which occurs in the later primary school or early middle school years. Yet,
there are a couple of reasons to believe that mobility constraints affect the primary
school enrollment decision. First, reputational risk to the family is still a concern
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for younger girls. Allowing them unfettered mobility may signal a loose attitude
about female honor in general, with repercussions for other womenfolk. Second,
because the decision to enroll a child is driven in large part by the option value of
future schooling, and because schooling is costly, anything that raises the likelihood
of dropping out of primary school in the future will reduce the incentive to enroll at
the outset.
With these considerations in mind, we state our two main hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: Holding constant travel time to school, a girl who would have to
cross settlement boundaries to attend school will be less likely to enroll than
a girl who can attend a school in her own settlement. The same crossing-
boundary effect should not be observed for boys.
Hypothesis 2: Children will be more likely to be enrolled in school if their caste
status coincides with that of the dominant caste of the settlement containing
their most convenient school (child-school caste concordance).
4 Salience of Settlement Boundaries
4.1 Empirical strategy
We use household and school GPS coordinates, and information on the year of school
establishment, to identify the location of each primary school that was available
in or near the child’s village by the time the child turned 9. As new schools are
established (and old ones closed down), the set of available schools can differ between
two children of different ages living in the same settlement. Moreover, since single-
sex schools are common in Pakistan, the set of available schools will also vary within
settlements by the gender of the child. From this information, we can construct
the two key variables for our test of hypothesis 1:
 =
(
1 if school for child  lies inside settlement 
0 otherwise
(1)
where settlement  of village  is that in which child  resides, and
 =
(
distance to inside-settlement school if  = 1
distance to nearest outside-settlement school if  = 0  (2)
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If there are multiple schools available within the settlement, we chose the nearest
one to child  for the calculation of 
The summary statistics in Table 1 show that around three-quarters of children
in our sample had an appropriate type of school available in their settlement at the
time they were nine years-old. While gender differences in  are negligible, the
regional differences are stark: 89% of children had access to inside-settlement schools
in North Punjab, a figure which drops to 51% in Southern Punjab with its much
greater proliferation of settlements in a typical village. To separate the crossing-
boundary effect from the effect of distance it is important that the distribution of
 conditional on  = 1 share common support with the distribution of 
conditional on  = 0 Figure 1 shows that there is indeed considerable overlap;
86% of inside settlement-schools lie within half a kilometer of the child’s residence
compared to 38% of out-of-settlement schools. At the tail of the school distance
distribution, of course, outside schools dominate.
Ignoring child gender differences for the moment, consider the following regres-
sion equation for school enrollment :
 =  + () + 0 +  +  +  (3)
where  is a vector of child and household characteristics and   and  are
village-specific, settlement-specific, and child-specific error components, respectively.
The parameter  captures the crossing-boundary effect and (·) is the (possibly)
non-linear mapping from school distance to the decision ever to enroll the child.
In the empirical implementation, we let , and  differ by child gender. In
particular, this allows us to test the null hypothesis that  = ; as mentioned,
we anticipate that   0 and   
Non-random placement of schools is the principal threat to the validity of OLS
estimates of equation (3). Those villages, and even those settlements within vil-
lages, that have a particularly high demand for education (or any other unobserved
characteristic positively correlated with school enrollment) may be more likely to
receive a school, thus inducing a (positive) correlation between  and  and/or
. To deal with the non-random placement of schools across villages, we use
village fixed effects throughout our analysis to purge .
In addressing the remaining issue of , it will be useful to assume
()⊥|   (4)
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which, if  is linear, is tantamount to ⊥|  . In words, given school
settlement location, distance to school (or any function thereof) is uncorrelated with
the settlement-specific demand for education. The intuition for this conditional ex-
ogeneity of  is as follows: When  = 1 an available school lies inside the
child’s own settlement, which, of course, may signal a high , but the distance
between the child’s household and the within-settlement school is likely to be ran-
dom.8 When  = 0, so that the child’s settlement does not have the right type of
school,  is the distance between the child’s residence and an arbitrary location
in a neighboring settlement, the one containing the nearest available school. The
distance between child and school settlements is—conditional on average distance to
school in the village—for all intents and purposes a matter of pure chance, plausibly
unrelated to relative demand for education across settlements.
With conditional exogeneity of  we can investigate the potential correlation
of  and  without even having to partial out (). This allows us to work
with the simpler regression model
 = e + e0 +  +  +  (5)
where e = +P(();  ) andP is the linear projection of () on the
remaining regressors and village dummies. So, e confounds the crossing-boundary
effect  with the effect that a within-settlement school has on distance to school.
But, given that  and  are fairly highly correlated, equation (5) should provide
more powerful tests of the exogeneity of  than equation (3).
This brings us to the two alternative testing strategies:
1. Settlement fixed effects: Recall that because a child’s set of available schools
differs according to their age (i.e., cohort) and gender,  varies within set-
tlements. Moreover, even if  were constant within settlements, we could
still identify the gender difference  −  (or e − e). Settlement
fixed effects supersede village fixed effects, purging both  and 
2. Instrumental variables with village fixed effects: We exploit the fact that,
within villages, public schools are largely allocated to high population set-
tlements. Since we know the number of households in each settlement, we
8To anticipate a possible concern that might arise in section 5, there is no significant relationship
between the distance to an inside-settlement school and a child’s caste status, whether or not we
condition on the full set of other covariates ultimately used in our regressions. Thus, there is no
evidence that schools are placed within settlements so as to be closer to high caste neighborhoods.
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can construct a variable  = proportion of households in village  resid-
ing in settlement . Given this school allocation mechanism, we expect
( |)  0 The validity of excluding  from equation (5) de-
pends on the extent of intra-village mobility. If those households with a
relatively strong demand for education tend to relocate to settlements already
having schools or set up new settlements next to existing schools, then set-
tlement population shares could reflect schooling preferences, rendering them
inadmissible as instruments. While the establishment of new settlements is
far-fetched in our context given long-standing land ownership patterns, the
possibility of intra-village migration in response to school availability cannot
be as easily dismissed.9 However, in our analysis of village census data in
the Appendix, we fail to find evidence of increased migration into settlements
with newly established primary schools. This result supports our strategy
of treating settlement population shares within a village as exogenous with
respect to school availability.
To facilitate IV estimation and comparability across estimators we employ the
linear probability model with standard errors clustered at the settlement, the lowest-
level sampling unit in the household survey.10 However, for the final results in the
paper we present the corresponding probit estimates as well.
4.2 Results
To investigate the endogeneity of school location, as just discussed, the first four
specifications in Table 3 exclude distance to school. In the first column, we see
that, conditional only on village fixed effects and child age, the presence of a school
in the settlement increases girls’ enrollment rate by 18.6 percentage points, which
is very close to the conditional gender gap in school enrollment. In other words,
girls with a school in their settlement have practically the same enrollment rate as
boys.
9Andrabi, et al. 2007, follow a related strategy of using information on village population in
rural Pakistan to instrument the availability of schools at the village level. They assume that
households do not migrate across villages to take advantage of schooling opportunities.
10Specifically, we want to directly compare estimates derived from strategies 1 and 2. However,
if we take the discrete choice route, we would have to use a fixed effect logit for strategy 1 (given
the large number of settlements relative to children) and a probit IV for strategy 2 (noting that
the former estimator does not produce marginal effects). Moreover, as we will see later, probit
(or logit) estimation is only possible on a reduced sample, which compromises efficiency relative
to a linear probability model.
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Next we control for household wealth using a dummy variable for whether the
household is landless along with the log of per-capita household expenditures mea-
sured at the time of the survey. Neither variable is a perfect proxy for wealth, but
together they should do a reasonable job of capturing such variation. Allowing the
coefficients on these variables to differ by the gender of the child, we see that girls’
enrollment is quite a bit more responsive to wealth than that of boys, but that the
coefficients on  barely change.
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 3 provide evidence on the exogeneity of  con-
ditional on the village fixed effect, household wealth proxies, and other regressors.
Our first procedure involves simply taking out settlement fixed effects. Although
the standard errors on e and e more than double as a consequence, the coeffi-
cient estimates barely differ from their counterparts in column (2); the estimate ofe, moreover, remains statistically significant.
The instrumental variable estimates in column (4) also belie school placement
endogeneity.11 In particular, we would expect upward bias in e and e, as set-
tlements with stronger education demand are more likely to attract schools. While
there is a weak indication of upward bias for boys, just the opposite is observed
for girls. Looking at the IV estimate of the gender difference e − e, we re-
main extremely confident that the enrollment impact of having an inside-settlement
school (inclusive of its effect through distance to school) is greater for girls than
for boys. Finally, using the settlement rank instead of the share of population as
the instrument (e.g., dummies for first and second most populous settlements in the
village) makes very little difference for the results.
Accepting now that our estimates of crossing-boundary effects are not likely to be
an artifact of school placement decisions, we drop back to the least-squares/village
dummy variable estimator and begin to control for distance to school. This is done
in linear form in column (5) and with a cubic polynomial in distance in column (6).
In both cases, the  coefficients fall only marginally relative to column (2). Figure
2 plots predicted enrollment for boys and girls as a function of distance based on the
estimates in column (6). Erecting a settlement boundary between her household
and a next-door school would reduce a girl’s enrollment by as much as moving that
school two and a half kilometers away within the same settlement.
11Instrument diagnostics reported in the footnote to Table 3 strongly reject underidentification
and weak identification and fail to reject overidentification. Also, adding instruments involving
squared population shares improves the efficiency of the 2SLS estimate (i.e., redudancy of these
instruments is strongly rejected).
13
Given the paucity of inside-settlement schools at the greater distances, as seen
in figure 1, we also experimented with alternative distance cutoffs to check whether
our estimates of  and  are sensitive to the exclusion of far away schools.
The results are, in fact, highly robust. For example, re-estimating the model in
column (6) using the 3,454 children whose most convenient school is within just 500
meters, we obtain b = 0187 (0056) and b = −0011 (0037).
Lastly, we investigate the impact of middle school location on primary school
enrollment decisions by including variables analogous to  and  for middle
schools. The likelihood of having a middle school inside one’s settlement is far
lower than of having a primary school (20% for boys and 29% for girls) and middle
schools are considerably more distant on average as well. Indeed, since the degree
of overlap between the distribution of distance for inside and outside settlement
middle schools is so much lower than was the case for primary schools (cf., figure
1), separately identifying crossing-boundary and distance effects for middle school
is likely to be far more difficult. Thus, we find in column (7), that having a middle
school inside the settlement significantly raises enrollment rates for girls but not
for boys, paralleling the results for primary school. However, including a cubic
polynomial in distance to middle school in column (8) largely wipes out this middle
school crossing-boundary effect (757 middle school distances are missing because the
child had no such school available). The important result, returning to our main
argument, is that the primary school crossing-boundary effects are not driven by
correlations between primary and middle school placement; the coefficients on the
primary school  are quite robust (compare columns (6) and (8)).
5 Salience of Caste-based Stigma
5.1 Empirical strategy
The key variable for testing our second hypothesis is an indicator of child-school
caste-concordance. Let
 =
(
child ’s caste = settlement ’s dominant caste if  = 1
child ’s caste = nearest school settlement’s dominant caste if  = 0 
(6)
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If the nearest school outside the settlement is not contained within any one set-
tlement (5% of cases), we match it to the nearest settlement and assign it the
corresponding dominant caste.
Means of  by gender, caste, and region are shown in Table 1. Reflecting
the residential patterns already discussed, high-caste children are more than twice
as likely overall to have access to a caste-concordant school than low-caste chil-
dren. Regionally, southern Punjab fares the worst on these terms with only 11%
of low-caste children having their most convenient school in a low-caste dominant
settlement.
5.2 Results
In the first column of Table 4, we introduce caste-status as a determinant of en-
rollment behavior in a stripped-down model with only gender-age interactions and
village fixed effects. Once we look within villages, there is little difference in school
enrollment between high and low-caste boys. By contrast, there is a 97 percent-
age point gap in enrollment rates favoring high over low-caste girls, albeit not a
statistically significant one. Controlling for household wealth in column (2) using
the landless dummy and the per-capita expenditure variable as before lowers this
marginal effect of higher caste status to 74 percentage points. So a modest share of
caste differences in enrollment can be explained by the greater wealth of high-caste
households.
Next we investigate the crossing settlement boundary effect by child caste, con-
ditioning again on distance to school. The results, reported in column (3), are
remarkable. Practically the entire positive enrollment effect of having a school
in one’s settlement that we observed in Table 3 is concentrated among high-caste
girls. Low-caste girls appear to be indifferent to the presence of an inside-settlement
school. One plausible explanation for this finding is that, as noted earlier, there
is a much higher proportion of low-caste children living in high-caste dominant set-
tlements (48%) than of high-caste children living in low-caste dominant settlements
(6%). Given caste-based stigma, the psychic cost of attending a local school if one
exists is high for these low-caste girls.
Results in column (4) confirm our suspicions, as well as field interviews suggesting
that caste-based stigma cuts across gender lines.12 Low-caste girls with access to
12We had to drop 229 observations in this analysis because the most convenient school was not
within the village and, therefore, information on the caste-dominance of the school settlement was
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a caste-concordant school enroll at a rate 28 percentage points higher than their
counterparts without such schools, whereas there is no significant difference for
high-caste girls. For low-caste boys, the child-school caste concordance effect is
also important but only about half as large, at 14 percentage points, as it is for low-
caste girls, and there is no effect at all for high-caste boys. An otherwise identical
probit model yields marginal caste-concordance effects of comparable magnitude
and significance: 0350 (0058) for low-caste girls; 0132 (0053) for low-caste boys;
essentially zero for high-caste children.13
Does the saliency of settlement boundaries reemerge for low-caste girls with
access to a caste-concordant school? To answer this question (estimate the four-
way interaction between girl, caste, , and ), we would need significant
numbers of low-caste girls with caste-concordant schools both inside and outside
their own settlements. However, low-caste children are concentrated in relatively
few low-caste dominant settlements; only 20 of the 176 low-caste girls in our sample
who have a nearest school in a low-caste dominant settlement ( = 1) do not
have this school in their own settlement ( = 0). This fact renders credible
estimation of the four-way interaction practically impossible.
Our estimates, at any rate, imply that if all girls were given access to a caste-
concordant school within their own settlement (i.e.,  = 1 and  = 1), then
the enrollment gap between high and low-caste girls would fall to −63 percentage
points, which is to say that the enrollment rate of low-caste girls would actually be
higher than that of high-caste girls. The same calculation shows an even bigger
marginal effect for boys, with low-caste enrollment now exceeding that of high-
castes by 91 percentage points. These results suggest that, if anything, the latent
demand for education is higher among low-caste households than among their high-
caste neighbors in the village; in the absence of communal barriers to schooling,
they would actually be more likely to send their children to school. Low-status per
se does not appear to dampen parents’ aspirations for their children.
not available.
13Unlike the linear probability model, the probit estimation drops 33 villages (865 observations)
in which all sample children had ever enrolled in primary school. Nevertheless, the crossing
settlement boundary effects are also practically identical across estimators, with the probit marginal
probability for high-caste girls at 0184 (0041) and insignificant for all other children.
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6 Policy Implications
Our findings on the salience of geographic boundaries and the caste-composition
of settlements have important implications for school allocation decisions in rural
Pakistan. We illustrate this point by comparing the following hypothetical policies
targeted to the population of 9-12 year-old children (the most recent 3-year cohort)
in all PRHS-II villages:
Policy 1: Provide a girl’s school to every settlement currently lacking one.
Policy 2: Provide a school to a low-caste dominant settlement in every village
currently lacking one.
Based on our estimates (using only statistically significant coefficients), Policy 1
will induce only more high-caste girls to enroll in school, whereas Policy 2 will draw
in only additional low-caste boys and girls. To level the playing field somewhat
on the cost-side, we restrict the first policy to settlements with at least a 10%
high-caste population and the second policy to villages with at least a 10% low-
caste population, thus avoiding the construction of a large number of "superfluous"
schools.14 The question is: Which policy increases enrollment rates most cost-
effectively?
Table 5 summarizes the horserace. Our analysis uses estimates from column
(4) of Table 4 combined with village census data to obtain population weights for
each settlement as well as the proportion of low-caste households within each settle-
ment.15 16 As mentioned, the enrollment impacts of Policy 1 are zero for boys as well
as for low-caste girls. High-caste girls increase their enrollment, but not by much
(5.3 percentage points). The reason is that, since higher population settlements
typically already have a school, Policy 1 disproportionately serves smaller settle-
ments and thus does not greatly increase school access on a population-weighted
basis. Policy 2, by contrast, does not suffer the same defect; more populous settle-
ments tend to be in villages without a low-caste dominant school. Thus, Policy 2
14From the village census, we know that only 0.1% of the high-caste population resides in set-
tlements that are more than 90% low-caste and that 3.7% of the low-caste population resides in
villages that are more than 90% high-caste.
15Throughout our simulations we ignore the fact that building new schools will also reduce
distance to school. In this sense, the enrollment gains from the policies that we consider are
somewhat understated.
16The population proportion of girls among 9-12 year old children is calculated from our sample
and, along with household size, is assumed to be constant across settlements and caste-types.
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greatly boosts the enrollment rates of low-caste children of both genders and, even
though these children are in the distinct minority, increases aggregate enrollment
by nearly twice as much as Policy 1 (3.4 versus 1.9 percentage points).
Looking at the cost side, we see that implementing Policy 1 requires building
a school in 579 (out of 1,031) settlements. On the other hand, for Policy 2 a
mere 93 new schools are needed. The profligacy of Policy 1 relative to Policy 2
is obviously due to its targeting the settlement rather than the village.17 In sum,
Policy 2 delivers twice the overall impact at a sixth of the cost. Moreover, Policy
2 does far better at reaching the educationally disadvantaged low-caste population,
especially low-caste girls. These findings highlight the importance of recognizing
social fragmentation in remediating lack of access to public services.
7 Conclusion
We have seen that social constraints can interact in surprising ways to limit educa-
tional opportunities for girls. Entry into primary school is substantially discouraged
when girls have to cross settlement boundaries to attend, irrespective of the distance
they would have to travel. This effect is concentrated among high-caste girls, how-
ever; low-caste girls appear indifferent to settlement boundaries. But this is because
many low-caste children live in settlements dominated by high-caste households and
thus face particularly high barriers to attending a local school, if one exists.
A broader lesson of this paper is that differences in the returns to education—or
in household wealth, for that matter—do not fully account for school enrollment gaps
across gender and caste. There is a significant role for between-group variation in
schooling costs due to communal heterogeneity and the social barriers that arise
therefrom. Indeed, we have seen that if one could eliminate the influence of stigma,
low-caste children would enroll in primary school in greater proportions than their
high-caste counterparts. Given the difficulty of designing policies that raise the
returns to education on a large scale, our findings thus provide hope that suitably
targeted supply-side interventions can mitigate educational inequities.
17Implicit here is the assumption that capacity constraints are never binding for a new school;
they can accomodate any number of additional students induced to enroll.
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Appendix
Settlement In-migration and School Availability
Migration information, while not provided in the PRHS-II village census, is
available from a different village census conducted in 2006. This census includes
158 villages (420 settlements) in five districts, two in Punjab (one of which overlaps
with a district in PRHS-II), two in Sindh, and one in NWFP. The census was
supported by the World Bank and the Pakistan Poverty Alleviation Fund (PPAF).
Selected villages comprise the sample for the evaluation of the third phase of the
PPAF. The census questionnaire asks about the number of years of residence in the
settlement. We also have data on all of the schools within the boundaries of each
settlement, including their year of establishment.
We construct a settlement-level panel from 1980-2006 containing the number of
households migrating into a settlement in each year and indicators for the presence of
a boys and a girls public primary school by settlement-year. Excluding settlements
in which the first public primary school was established prior to 1980 as well as
those that had no public primary school at all up to 2006 leads to a sample of 115
settlements in 67 villages. The median total number of in-migrants over the whole
period is only 6 households, but the median settlement population (as of 2006) is
also just 42 households. There are 34 settlements that did not receive a single
new household since 1980. Overall, zero migrants are recorded in 79 percent of the
settlement-years.
Appendix Table A.2 reports regressions of the number of in-migrants on the
presence of a boy’s or girl’s public primary school that include settlement fixed effects
and a cubic polynomial in years since 1980 (year dummies gave similar results in all
specifications). Thus, we are asking whether migration into a particular settlement
(we do not have data on out-migration) increases after a school is established. OLS
estimates in column (1) and (2) provide no evidence that this is the case, either
for boys and girls schools separately or together for any primary school. A panel-
estimator suitable for count data, the fixed effect Poisson, gives similar results in
columns (3) and (4), automatically dropping all observations in the 34 settlements
that received no migrants over the entire period.
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Figure 1:  CDF of distance to (nearest) school for inside and outside schools. 
 
Figure 2:  Predicted school enrollment by school distance and location. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics for Sample 
  
Boys 9-15 Girls 9-15 All Children 9-15 
Region 
Low-
caste 
High-
caste Total 
Low-
caste 
High-
caste Total 
Low-
caste 
High-
caste Total 
North Punjab 
          Ever enrolled 0.80 0.94 0.92 0.79 0.86 0.85 0.80 0.90 0.89 
 
Θprimary school 0.86 0.91 0.91 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.86 0.90 0.89 
CC 0.22 0.94 0.86 0.25 0.95 0.86 0.23 0.94 0.86 
 
N 111 834 945 101 747 848 212 1,581 1,793 
South Punjab 
         
 
Ever enrolled 0.6 0.70 0.68 0.34 0.55 0.51 0.48 0.63 0.60 
 
Θprimary school 0.3 0.57 0.52 0.18 0.57 0.49 0.24 0.57 0.51 
 
CC 0.12 0.92 0.78 0.09 0.92 0.76 0.11 0.92 0.77 
 
N 96 385 481 90 341 431 186 726 912 
Sindh 
         
 
Ever enrolled 0.70 0.79 0.76 0.44 0.55 0.52 0.58 0.68 0.65 
 
Θprimary school 0.76 0.71 0.72 0.74 0.69 0.70 0.75 0.70 0.71 
 
CC 0.50 0.89 0.77 0.58 0.91 0.81 0.53 0.90 0.79 
 
N 335 746 1,081 261 652 913 596 1,398 1,994 
All Pakistan 
         
 
Ever enrolled 0.70 0.84 0.81 0.50 0.68 0.65 0.61 0.77 0.73 
 
Θprimary school 0.70 0.77 0.75 0.66 0.75 0.73 0.68 0.76 0.74 
 
CC 0.38 0.92 0.8 0.41 0.93 0.82 0.40 0.92 0.81 
 
N 542 1,965 2,507 452 1,740 2,192 994 3,705 4,699 
Notes:  All statistics are means of indicator variables.  All Pakistan refers to Punjab and Sindh provinces.  Θprimary school
  
and CC are dummies for, respectively, whether a school is available within the child’s settlement and whether the 
most convenient school is in a settlement where the child’s own caste is dominant (see text for details). 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics for Village Census 
  
  Region  
  
All Sindh South Punjab North Punjab 
    Settlement Village Settlement Village Settlement Village Settlement Village 
Settlements (median no.) --- 10 --- 12 --- 11 --- 4 
Zaat/biradari groups (median no.) 2 9 2 10 3 8 4 8 
Low-caste households (%) 30 29 36 34 23 23 20 22 
Single Caste-type (%) 52 3 60 2 50 0 28 6 
 
Of which, high-caste (%) 75 100 68 100 87 --- 98 100 
High-caste dominant (%) 83 96 79 97 82 97 96 94 
N   1031 165 581 61 268 32 182 72 
Note:  A zaat/biradari group represents a distinctly named caste/clan affiliation, whereas a caste-type is a categorization of the 
latter into high and low status as described in the text.  Caste dominance is based on which type owns the majority of the land in the 
settlement/village. 
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Table 3 
Crossing-Boundary Effect on School Enrollment:  Children Age 9-15 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)
a (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Girl × θprimary school 0.186*** 0.181*** 0.186** 0.216*** 0.150*** 0.151*** 0.118*** 0.138*** 
 (0.035) (0.034) (0.076) (0.063) (0.038) (0.039) (0.040) (0.044) 
Boy × θprimary school 0.039 0.035 0.003 -0.086 -0.009 -0.019 -0.009 -0.020 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.077) (0.054) (0.029) (0.030) (0.030) (0.031) 
Girl × landless 
 
-0.089*** -0.073*** -0.090*** -0.085*** -0.086*** -0.085*** -0.103*** 
  
(0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) 
Boy × landless 
 
-0.066*** -0.062*** -0.069*** -0.063*** -0.065*** -0.067*** -0.077*** 
  
(0.018) (0.021) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) 
Girl × ln(pce) 
 
0.104*** 0.108*** 0.103*** 0.106*** 0.106*** 0.102*** 0.090*** 
  
(0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.019) 
Boy × ln(pce) 
 
0.048*** 0.055*** 0.048*** 0.048*** 0.048*** 0.053*** 0.043** 
  
(0.018) (0.021) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Girl × θMiddle school       
0.120*** 0.051 
       
(0.036) (0.042) 
Boy × θMiddle school       
0.002 0.018 
       
(0.039) (0.044) 
Gender × dprimary school No No No No Linear Cubic Cubic Cubic 
Gender × dmiddle school No No No No No No No Cubic 
Fixed effects village village settlement village village village village Village 
N 4,699 4,695 4,695 4,695 4,695 4,695 4,695 3,938 
Adj. R2 0.248 0.265 0.327 --- 0.270 0.272 0.275 0.268 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses clustered on settlement (*** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1).  There are 496 
settlements in 165 villages.  Dependent variable is an indicator for whether the child was ever enrolled in school.  All 
regressions include a girl dummy and the age of child interacted with girl and boy dummy variables.  Θj is a dummy 
for whether a school of type j=primary,middle is available within the child’s settlement; dj is distance to (nearest) 
school of type j. 
 
a2SLS estimate using village population share of settlement and its square, both interacted with the Girl and Boy 
dummies, as instruments.  Instrument diagnostics are as follows:  Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test Wald 
stat = 59.0 (3); Kleibergen-Paap weak identification Wald rk F-stat = 33.8; Hansen overidentification J-test stat = 4.2 
(2); LM test of redundancy of instruments involving squared population shares = 41.2 (4), where numbers in 
parentheses are degrees of freedom for chi-square statistics. 
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Table 4 
Caste Effects on School Enrollment:  Children Age 9-15 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Low-caste boys --- --- --- --- 
 
    
High-caste boys 0.032 0.023 0.022 0.050 
 (0.030) (0.029) (0.049) (0.068) 
Low-caste girls -0.103 -0.588** -0.711*** -0.899*** 
 (0.080) (0.228) (0.237) (0.243) 
High caste girls -0.006 -0.514** -0.722*** -0.911*** 
 (0.081) (0.229) (0.237) (0.245) 
Low-caste boys × θprimary sch.   -0.011 -0.057 
   
(0.054) (0.061) 
High-caste boys × θprimary sch.   
-0.018 0.005 
   
(0.032) (0.034) 
Low-caste girls × θprimary sch.   
0.069 0.031 
   
(0.074) (0.078) 
High caste girls × θprimary sch.   
0.176*** 0.200*** 
   
(0.042) (0.041) 
Low-caste boys × CC 
   
0.138** 
    
(0.054) 
High-caste boys × CC 
   
-0.064 
    
(0.051) 
Low-caste girls × CC 
   
0.277*** 
    
(0.063) 
High caste girls × CC 
   
0.057 
    
(0.077) 
 
    
Gender × wealth No Yes Yes Yes 
Gender × dprimary sch No No cubic Cubic 
Fixed effects village village village Village 
 
    
N 4,699 4,695 4,695 4,466 
Adj. R2 0.240 0.256 0.273 0.287 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses clustered on settlement (*** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p 
<0.1).  There are 496 settlements in 165 villages.  Dependent variable is an indicator for 
whether the child was ever enrolled in school.  All regressions include the age of child 
interacted with girl and boy dummy variables.  CC is a dummy for whether the most convenient 
school is in a settlement where the child’s own caste is dominant (see notes to Table 3 for 
definitions of other variables). 
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Table 5 
School Placement Policy Simulations 
 
Low caste High caste All 
Boy 
   
Policy 1 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Policy 2 0.092 0.000 0.023 
Initial  enrollment 0.714 0.855 0.820 
Girl 
   
Policy 1 0.000 0.053 0.040 
Policy 2 0.187 0.000 0.047 
Initial  enrollment 0.507 0.700 0.649 
All Children 
   
Policy 1 0.000 0.025 0.019 
Policy 2 0.137 0.000 0.034 
Initial  enrollment 0.616 0.780 0.739 
Notes:   All figures, except for the initial enrollment rates of 9-12 year-olds, 
represent changes in the proportion of children in PRHS-II villages who ever 
enroll in school.  Initial enrollment rates are based on means from the 
estimation sample by caste-type, which are then weighted using village census 
data to achieve representativeness across caste-type.  See text for a 
description of the policies.   
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Table A.1 
Descriptive Statistics for Schools 
 Total (N) 
School Typea Caste Dominance of School Settlement 
Public (%) Private (%) High (%) Low (%) No info (%)b 
          Panel A:  Elementary-level Schools in the Census 
          N Punjab       
    All Boys 179 93 6 59 3 38 
    All Girls  114 94 6 61 4 34 
    Co-Ed  228 29 68 66 1 33 
    Total 521 65 33 63 2 35 
         S Punjab       
    All Boys 82 93 4 41 4 55 
   All Girls  65 95 2 51 5 45 
   Co-Ed  88 23 69 45 5 50 
   Total 235 67 28 46 4 50 
         Sindh       
    All Boys 48 100 0 56 15 29 
   All Girls  48 92 2 63 8 29 
   Co-Ed  260 89 9 48 13 39 
   Total 356 91 7 51 12 37 
        All Schools  1,112 74 24 55 6 39 
          Panel B:  Elementary-level Schools in the Sample 
         N Punjab       
    All Boys 74 99 1 95 5 0 
    All Girls  66 97 2 88 8 4 
    Co-Ed  135 31 65 83 1 16 
    Total 275 65 33 87 4 9 
         S Punjab       
    All Boys 32 94 3 71 9 20 
   All Girls  36 97 0 75 6 19 
   Co-Ed  44 36 52 70 7 23 
   Total 114 73 21 72 7 21 
        Sindh       
    All Boys 29 100 0 73 17 10 
   All Girls  29 93 3 73 10 17 
   Co-Ed  158 95 1 68 16 16 
   Total 216 95 1 69 16 15 
        All Schools 605 77 19 78 9 13 
Notes:  Census data in Panel A reflect an exhaustive list of schools to which children in the 165 sample 
villages had access to and hence include many peripheral schools.  Schools in Panel B are those nearest 
to the sample children or within the same settlement. 
a
Other types of schools include community, NGO, and religious. 
b
School located outside of village boundaries, hence no caste information from village census.  
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Table A.2 
School Establishment Effect on Settlement In-migration: 1980-2006 
 OLS Poisson 
     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Girl’s public primary 
school in settlement 
0.127 
 
0.167 
 
(0.199) 
 
(0.213) 
 
     
Boy’s public primary 
school in settlement 
0.056 
 
0.135 
 
(0.212) 
 
(0.225) 
 
     
Any public primary 
school in settlement 
 
0.153 
 
0.233 
 
(0.137) 
 
(0.209) 
 
Year 
 
cubic 
 
cubic 
 
cubic 
 
cubic 
Fixed effects settlement settlement settlement settlement 
N 3105 3105 2187 2187 
Settlements 115 115 81 81 
Notes:   Standard errors in parentheses clustered on settlement.  Dependent variable is 
the number of households migrating into settlement in year. 
 
 
